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Synopsis. We consider non-parametric density estimation in the framework of local ap-
proximate differential privacy. In contrast to centralized privacy scenarios with a trusted
curator, in the local setup anonymization must be guaranteed already on the individual
data owners’ side and therefore must precede any data mining tasks. Thus, the published
anonymized data should be compatible with as many statistical procedures as possible.
We suggest adding Laplace noise and Gaussian processes (both appropriately scaled) to
kernel density estimators to obtain approximate differential private versions of the latter
ones. We obtain minimax type results over Sobolev classes indexed by a smoothness
parameter s > 1/2 for the mean squared error at a fixed point. In particular, we show
that taking the average of private kernel density estimators from n different data owners
attains the optimal rate of convergence if the bandwidth parameter is correctly specified.
Notably, the optimal convergence rate in terms of the sample size n is n−(2s−1)/(2s+1)
under local differential privacy and thus deteriorated to the rate n−(2s−1)/(2s) which
holds without privacy restrictions. Since the optimal choice of the bandwidth parameter
depends on the smoothness s and is thus not accessible in practice, adaptive methods
for bandwidth selection are necessary and must, in the local privacy framework, be per-
formed directly on the anonymized data. We address this problem by means of a variant
of Lepski’s method tailored to the privacy setup and obtain general oracle inequalities for
private kernel density estimators. In the Sobolev case, the resulting adaptive estimator
attains the optimal rate of convergence at least up to extra logarithmic factors.
1. Introduction
In the modern information era data are routinely collected in all areas of private and
public life. Although the availability of massive data sets is essential to answer impor-
tant scientific and societal questions, the individual data owners (who may be individuals,
households, research institutions, companies, . . . ) might refuse to share their, maybe sen-
sitive, raw data with others. Even more, in view of regularly reported data leaks, they
may not even want to entrust their data to a central curator who stores the data and pub-
lishes anonymized summary statistics. Finding ourselves in such a dilemma, the question
whether and, if yes, how data analytics can still be performed is of special importance.
For the evaluation of this question, several aspects have to be taken into account.
Firstly, in absence of a trusted curator, privacy of the data has to be achieved already
locally at the individual data owners’ level. The i-th data holder takes its datum, say
Xi, as the input of a privacy mechanism and creates an output Zi that is considered
sufficiently anonymized, for instance, in the sense of any of the privacy definitions listed
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2 M. KROLL
below. For the purpose of the present paper, a privacy mechanism is a Markov kernel Qi
between measurable spaces (X,X ) and (Z,Z ) generating Zi given Xi = x according to
the distribution QZi|Xi=x. This definition of local privacy is in contrast to the framework
of centralized or global privacy where the trusted curator can take the whole data set
{X1, . . . , Xn} to create an output Z.1
Secondly, for the quantification of privacy, different solutions have been proposed so far
(see [BD14], Section 2 for a comprehensive overview of existing privacy definitions):
• In this paper, we will exclusively work in the framework of α-differential privacy
and its generalization (α, β)-differential privacy as defined in Definition 2.1 below.
These two privacy definitions are also referred to as pure and approximate differ-
ential privacy, respectively. Originally, these concepts have been suggested for the
anonymization of microdata tables in a global privacy setup, more precisely in a
framework where queries are answered by a server that has direct access to the sen-
sitive data [Dwo06, Dwo+06, Dwo08]. In the statistics community, working under
privacy constraints has been popularized in the past decade, amongst others, through
the articles [WZ10, HRW13] (in the global setup) and [DJW18] (in the local privacy
setup). Another strict relaxation of pure differential privacy is random differential
privacy as introduced in [HRW11].
• An alternative quantification of privacy can be given as follows: Let ϕ be a function
from [0,∞] to R ∪ {+∞} with ϕ(1) = 0. Then, the associated ϕ-divergence between
two distributions P,Q is
Dϕ(P||Q) =
∫
ϕ
(dP
dQ
)
dQ =
∫
ϕ
(
p
q
)
qdµ
where µ is a measure such that P,Q µ and p, q denote the corresponding Radon-
Nikodym densities. Then, the mechanism Q is called α-ϕ-divergence private if
sup
x,x′∈X
Dϕ(Q(·|X = x)||Q(·|X = x′)) 6 α.
The intersection of these two concepts is non-empty: For instance, taking ϕ(x) = |x−1|/2,
the ϕ-divergence Dϕ(P||Q) is the total variation distance, and the resulting α-ϕ-divergence
is equivalent to (0, β)-differential privacy.
Thirdly, the published data Z1, . . . , Zn should ideally be multi-purpose in the sense that
they can serve as input data for several types of analyses. Thus, when the unmasked data
are for instance a sample from an unknown probability distribution, the anonymized data
should contain as much information as possible about the whole distribution and not only
about certain characteristics. One main motivation for this work is to introduce novel
methodology in the framework of density estimation that aims to address also this issue
by proposing a local approximate differential private version of kernel density estimators,
that is, the whole function t 7→ K((Xi − t)/h)/h for a bandwidth parameter h > 0 along
with a study of their theoretical properties. Figure 1 gives a foretaste and provides a
graphical representation of the general workflow developed in this paper.
Roadmap of the article. Throughout the article, we consider the paradigmatic example
of non-parametric density estimation. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that each of
n data holders Di observes a size-one sample Xi from a (in this paper) univariate target
density f , but refuses to share this observation. In Section 2, we first introduce two
mechanisms to estrange the value of an kernel density estimator at a single fixed point
t ∈ R. The first approach is based on adding appropriately scaled Laplace noise. The
second approach is based on adding Gaussian noise and can be extended, using the ideas
1Thus, the local privacy model can be seen as a proper submodel of the global one because the trusted
curator can also mimic any conceivable procedure in the local model.
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Figure 1. General workflow of our procedure in the framework of univariate density estimation. Objects
in blue boxes can only be observed by the respective data holder in the same box. Every data owner
computes a kernel density estimator based only on its proper observation (given by the first coordinate
of the black points). These estimators can be published after being perturbed by an appropriate centred
Gaussian process (output in the pistachio coloured boxes). The pointwise mean of the private kernel
density estimators (black solid curve) provides a natural estimator of the unknown density function (red
dashed curve).
introduced in [HRW13], to an anonymized version of the whole kernel density estimator
(as a function from R to R) via perturbation by a suitable Gaussian process. In Section 3,
we consider estimation of the unknown density function under approximate differential
privacy from a minimax point of view. As the performance measure to evaluate arbitrary
estimators, we consider the mean squared error at a fixed point. Both the Laplace and the
Gaussian perturbation approach attain the optimal rate n−(2s−1)/(2s+1) in terms of n over
Sobolev ellipsoids with smoothness index s which is slower than the rate n−(2s−1)/(2s) in
the setup without privacy constraints. The Gaussian process approach, however, makes it
possible to estimate the value of the density at any point of the observation window and
not only at one single point that has to be chosen prior to the anonymization procedure. In
addition, this approach enables the statistician to perform any kind of analysis that plugs
kernel density estimators into others estimators. Investigating theoretical guarantees of
such plug-in procedures, however, is outside the scope of this work and deferred to future
research.
As usual for kernel density estimators, the choice of the bandwidth parameter is crucial.
In the considered minimax framework over Sobolev classes, the optimal order of the band-
width that leads to a rate optimal estimator depends on the smoothness index s which is
typically unknown. In Section 4, we apply a Lepski scheme tailored to the privacy frame-
work to overcome this problem and obtain an adaptive choice of the bandwidth. This issue
specifically arises in the local privacy setup since in the global framework the trusted cu-
rator can apply the existing plethora of methods for bandwidth selection on the unmasked
4 M. KROLL
data, and then only publish the resulting estimator with the adaptively determined band-
width in its anonymized form. In order to perform the Lepski scheme, any data owner has
to publish the kernel density estimator not only for one single bandwidth but for a finite
set of potential bandwidths. Such a multiple output still guarantees the desired privacy
condition provided that the additive noise is multiplied with a factor proportional to the
number of potential bandwidths which is logarithmic in the number of data sources in
our case. We derive general oracle type inequalities for the estimator resulting from the
Lepski procedure adapted to the privacy framework. For the specific example of Sobolev
ellipsoids, the rates of convergence are merely deteriorated by logarithmic factors with
respect to the case of a priori known smoothness.
2. Privacy mechanisms
2.1. Definition of approximate differential privacy. Let (X,X ) and (Z,Z ) be mea-
surable spaces. A privacy mechanism is a Markov kernel Q : X × Z → [0, 1] with the
interpretation that, given original data X = x, an anonymized output is randomly drawn
from the probability measure Q(·|X = x). In the non-interactive setup that we are going
to consider, we work under the following definition of approximate or (α, β)-differential
privacy.
Definition 2.1. Let α > 0, β ∈ [0, 1]. We say that Z ∼ Q(· | X) is a local (α, β)-
differentially private view of X if for all x, x′ ∈ X, A ∈ Z the estimate
Q(A | X = x) 6 exp(α)Q(A | X = x′) + β, (1)
holds true.
Let us emphasize that in Definition 2.1 the spaces (X,X ) and (Z,Z ) do not need to
coincide. In fact, in Example 2.9 the space (X,X ) will be the real line equipped with its
Borel sets and (Z,Z ) a measurable space of random functions. In the literature, the case
β = 0 is also referred to as α-differential privacy or pure differential privacy. Evidently, the
privacy condition (1) becomes more restrictive for smaller values of the two parameter α
and β. Although Definition 2.1 smoothly bridges the cases β = 0 and β > 0, the classical
anonymization techniques used for β = 0 and β > 0 are essentially different: In the case
β = 0, Laplace perturbation as well as randomization techniques as considered in [DJW18,
RS18] can be used. In the case β > 0, adding appropriately scaled Gaussian noise has been
suggested in [HRW13]. However, as proved in [HLM15], appropriately scaled Laplace noise
can also lead to approximately differential private outputs (see Proposition 2.2 below). In
the sequel, we discuss how to achieve approximate differential privacy by means of these
classical subroutines and how they can be extended to deal with functional data as well.
2.2. Univariate output using Laplace noise. First, we consider the case that both
the input and the output of the privacy mechanism are univariate and real-valued, that
is (X,X ) = (Z,Z ) = (R,B(R)). For this case, we consider Laplace perturbation which
is also used to derive an upper bound in Section 3. More precisely, let Yi = g(Xi) ∈ R a
quantity derived from the Xi that should be masked. Define the sensitivity of g as
∆(g) = sup
x,x′∈X
|g(x)− g(x′)|.
Recall that the univariate Laplace distribution, denoted by L(b), is given by the proba-
bility density function pb(x) = 12b exp(−|x|/b) (we include also the case b = 0; then the
Laplace distribution is, by convention, the Dirac measure concentrated at 0). In particu-
lar, the variance of an L(b) distributed random variable is 2b2. The following proposition
establishes approximate differential privacy by Laplace perturbation.
ADAPTIVE KERNEL DENSITY ESTIMATION UNDER LOCAL PRIVACY 5
Proposition 2.2 (See [HLM15], Example 5). Let α > 0, β ∈ [0, 1]. Then
Z = g(X) + bξ
with ξ ∼ L(1) for b > ∆(g)/(α− log(1− β)) provides an (α, β)-differential private view of
g(X) (and of X as well).
A benefit of Proposition 2.2 in contrast to the often proposed perturbation by Gaussian
noise to establish approximate differential privacy is that it allows to deal with the cases
β = 0 and β > 0 by the same approach. Moreover, letting the parameter β vary permits
natural interpretations: If β = 0, the variance of
√
2bξ corresponds to the one that is
usually encountered in the case of pure differential privacy. When β tends to one, the
privacy constraint gets weaker and the variance of the centred noise
√
2bξ tends to 0. In
the extreme case β = 1 it is even allowed to publish g(X) directly.
We now introduce kernel density estimators as the guiding example that we have in
mind for the function g for the rest of the paper.
Example 2.3. Let X1, . . . , Xn i.i.d. according to an unknown probability density function
f : R → R. Let t ∈ R be fixed. Then the i-th dataholder, who observes Xi ∈ R, can
compute
Kh(Xi − t) := 1
h
K
(
Xi − t
h
)
for a bounded kernel function K, that is, K : R → R is integrable and ∫ K(u)du = 1.
The quantity Kh(Xi − t) will play the role of g(X) in Proposition 2.2. By the triangle
inequality ∆(Kh(·−t)) 6 2‖K‖∞/h, and one can take any b > 2‖K‖∞/(h(α− log(1−β)))
to obtain an approximate differential private view of Kh(Xi − t). Note that t ∈ R has
been fixed in advance before the anonymization procedure.
2.3. Multivariate output. In principle, also multivariate output could be dealt with
by adding independent Laplace noise to any of the components of the vector to be pub-
lished. In this case, both α and β for each component have to be appropriately scaled in
order to obtain the desired level of approximate differential privacy for the whole vector
(the scaling can be carried out, for instance, as described in Lemma 2.16 below). This
approach, however, results in an increase concerning the Laplace noise added at any sin-
gle point where the kernel density estimator is evaluated, and thus might deteriorate the
performance of subsequent analyses more than necessary. We do not further pursue this
course here, since we will introduce a method for the anonymization of functional data
that does not inflate the noise at single points in the next subsection. Having stated this
general method, we can, for instance, anonymize the whole function · 7→ Kh(Xi − ·) in
Example 2.3, and as a by-product we obtain (α, β)-differential privacy for all pointwise
evaluations Kh(Xi− t), t ∈ R without any extra cost on the noise to be added. To achieve
anonymization of functional data, adding Gaussian processes with appropriately chosen
covariance structure turns out to be convenient. This idea has been originally suggested
in [HRW13], but we state the essential steps here again for a clear exposition, and refer
to [HRW13] only for the proofs. The first stopover on our way along the results from
[HRW13] is the following proposition that provides a condition under which approximate
differential privacy of a vector is obtained by adding multivariate Gaussian noise with not
necessarily uncorrelated components.
Proposition 2.4. Let α > 0, β ∈ (0, 1/2). Let further Σ ∈ Rm×m be a positive definite
matrix and g : X→ Rm for some m ∈ N∗. Assume that
sup
x,x′∈X
‖Σ−1/2(g(x)− g(x′))‖2 6 ∆ (2)
for all x, x′ ∈ X. Then, Z defined via
Z = g(X) + σΞ, Ξ ∼ N (0,Σ),
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is (α, β)-differential private provided that
σ > ∆
α
√
2 log(1/(2β)) + 2α. (3)
Proposition 2.4 will unfold its full potential in the next subsection where the condition
(2) will be reformulated appropriately. For the univariate case (taking m = 1), Propo-
sition 2.4 directly provides a result similar to the one in Example 2.3, again with t ∈ R
fixed before anonymization.
Example 2.5. We consider Kh(Xi − t) as in Example 2.3 and apply Proposition 2.4 for
m = 1 and Σ =
(
1
)
. As in Example 2.3,
sup
x,x′∈R
∣∣∣∣1hK
(
x− t
h
)
− 1
h
K
(
x′ − t
h
)∣∣∣∣ 6 2‖K‖∞h ,
and one can take ∆(Kh(· − t)) = 2‖K‖∞/h in (2). Then, Proposition 2.4 guarantees that
the Zi, i = 1, . . . , n defined through
Zi =
1
h
K
(
Xi − t
h
)
+ 2‖K‖∞
√
2 log(1/2β) + 2α
αh
ξi, ξi ∼ N (0, 1),
is an (α, β)-differential private view for α, β > 1/2 of gt(Xi) (and of Xi as well).
2.4. From multivariate to functional output. The anonymization techniques used
in Examples 2.3 and 2.5 both suffer from the drawback that the output Zi provides in-
formation on the kernel density estimator Kh(Xi − t) for one single t only. The aim of
this section, based on Proposition 2.4 and ideas introduced in [HRW13] in the context of
global privacy, is to construct a privatized version of the whole function t 7→ Kh(Xi − t)
by adding a suitable Gaussian process to the kernel density estimator. As a consequence,
the kernel density estimator anonymized in this vein can be evaluated at any single t ∈ R.
For univariate and multivariate real-valued outputs of privacy mechanisms, the role of
the σ-field Z in Definition 2.1 is canonically taken by the Borel sets on R or Rm. In the
case of functional output Z : X → Rm (where X is an arbritary set), its role is taken by
the σ-field C which is generated by the cylinder sets
CT,B = {f : X→ R : (f(t1), . . . , f(tm)) ∈ B}
where T ranges over all finite sets T = {t1, . . . , tm} ⊆ X and B ∈ B(Rm). The following
result is a reformulation of Proposition 7 in [HRW13] and we omit its proof. See also
Example 4 in [HLM15] for an alternative reasoning.
Proposition 2.6. Let Ξ : X → R be a sample path of a centred Gaussian process with
covariance kernel K : X× X→ R. For t1, . . . , tm ∈ X, consider the Gram matrix
Σt1,...,tm =
K(t1, t1) . . . K(t1, tm)... . . . ...
K(tm, t1) . . . K(tm, tm)
 .
Let X : X→ R be a (random) function in a function class F. Then, the release of
Z = X + σΞ
with σ fulfilling (3) is (α, β)-differential private (with respect to C ) provided that
sup
f,g∈F
sup
m∈N∗
sup
t1,...,tm∈X
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥Σ−1/2t1,...,tm
 f(t1)− g(t1)...
f(tm)− g(tm)

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
6 ∆ (4)
where ∆ is defined in (2).
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The main question arising from Proposition 2.6 is how the, on a first sight unhandy
condition (4), might be verified. The solution consists in transferring the problem into a
reproducing kernel Hilbert space (RKHS) setup. In fact, Proposition 2.6 can be applied ef-
fectively when the random functions to be masked belong to the RKHS which corresponds
to the covariance kernel of the Gaussian process Ξ.
In order to formulate this next result from [HRW13], we need to introduce some basic
notation concerning the considered RKHS (we refer the reader to [BT04] for a compre-
hensive introduction to RKHS theory). Let K : X × X → R be a positive definite kernel.
Recall that a real-valued kernel K : X× X→ R is positive definite if
k∑
i,j=1
aiajK(xi, xj) > 0 (5)
holds for any k ∈ N∗, {a1, . . . , ak} ⊆ R, and {x1, . . . , xk} ⊆ X. For any x ∈ X, define the
function Kx : X→ R by Kx(·) = K(x, ·). Then the set
H0 := {f : f =
∑
i∈I
ciKxi for some finite index set I}
is a pre-Hilbert space with respect to the norm ‖·‖H induced by the scalar product
〈f, g〉H =
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J
cidjK(xi, yj)
for f = ∑i∈I ciKxi , g = ∑j∈J djKyj . The RKHS corresponding to the kernel K is the
Hilbert space H resulting from the completion of H0 with respect to the RKHS norm ‖·‖H.
The following two results are again taken from [HRW13].
Proposition 2.7 (See [HRW13], Proposition 8). For f ∈ H, where H is the RKHS cor-
responding to the kernel K : X×X→ R, and for any finite sequence t1, . . . , tm of distinct
points from X, we have∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
K(t1, t1) . . . K(t1, tm)... . . . ...
K(tm, t1) . . . K(tm, tm)

−1/2 f(t1)...
f(tm)

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
6 ‖f‖H.
Corollary 2.8 (See [HRW13], Corollary 9). For X ∈ F ⊆ H, the release of
Z = X + σΞ
with σ as in (3) is (α, β)-differential private with respect to C provided that
sup
f,g∈F
‖f − g‖H 6 ∆, (6)
and Ξ is the sample path of centred Gaussian process with covariance kernel K (given by
the reproducing kernel of H).
We now apply Corollary 2.8 to kernel density estimators.
Example 2.9. In the case of univariate density estimation the i-th data holder observes
Xi drawn from the target density f , and we want him to be able to publish a approximately
differential private version of the kernel density estimator
f˜i,h(t) =
1
h
K
(
Xi − t
h
)
, t ∈ R,
based on his single observation Xi only. In order to apply the above theory we have to
assume that the kernel K(x, y) = K(x− y)2 is also a positive definite kernel. Under this
2We slightly abuse notation by denoting both the kernel of the kernel density estimator and the corre-
sponding kernel R× R→ R given through (x, y) 7→ K(x− y) by the letter K.
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additional assumption, Corollary 2.8 shows that the perturbed kernel density estimator
Zi,h(·) = f˜i,h(·) + ∆
α
√
2 log(1/(2β)) + 2αΞ
where Ξ a Gaussian process with kernel hKh(x, y) = K((x−y)/h) ensures (α, β)-differential
privacy provided that (6) is satisfied. For instance, for the Gaussian kernel KGauss(·) =
exp(−(·)2/2h2) we have
‖Kh(x− ·)−Kh(x′ − ·)‖2H =
1
2pih2 (KGauss(0) +KGauss(0)− 2KGauss(x− x
′)) 6 1
pih2
,
and we can take ∆ = 1/(
√
pih) (the same argument working for any non-negative bounded
kernel, and with a slight modification for any bounded kernel).
Let us emphasize that the property of positive definiteness is not satisfied for all kernels
commonly used for kernel density estimators in non-parametric statistics. In the following,
we discuss some popular examples.
Example 2.10. The rectangular kernel given by
K@A(x, y) ∝ 1{|x−y|61}
for x, y ∈ R is not positive definite. In order to see this, set x1 = 0, x2 = 34 , x3 = 32 ,
a1 = a3 = 1, and a2 = −1. Then
3∑
i=1
3∑
j=1
aiK@A(xi, xj)aj ∝ 3− 4 < 0,
which contradicts the defining property (5) of positive definite kernels.
Example 2.11. The triangular kernel given by
K4(x, y) ∝ (1− |x− y|)1{|x−y|61}
for x, y ∈ R is positive definite. This follows from the fact that kernels of the form
K(x, y) =
∫
Rd
f(t+ y)f(t+ y)dt
for x, y ∈ Rd with square integrable f : Rd → R are positive definite and
(1− |x− y|)1{|x−y|61} =
∫
R
1[0,1/2](t+ x)1[0,1/2](t+ y)dt.
Example 2.12. The Gaussian kernel
K(x, y) ∝ exp(−|x− y|2/2)
and the exponential kernel
K(x, y) ∝ exp(−|x− y|)
are positive definite. These kernels of the form K(x, y) ∝ exp(−|x− y|γ) are positive defi-
nite if and only if γ ∈ [0, 2]. This follows by combination of Theorem 2.2 and Exercise 2.13,
(b) in [BCR84].
Example 2.13. The sinc kernel given by
Ksinc(x, y) = sinc(x− y) = sin(pi(x− y))
pi(x− y)
is positive semidefinite since the si-function is the characteristic function of the uniform
distribution on the interval [−1, 1]. The sinc-kernel attains also negative values but grant
to the estimate 1 > sinc(·) > −0.3 we have, in analogy to the calculation in Example 2.9,
‖(Ksinc)x − (Ksinc)x′‖2H =
1
h2
(Ksinc(x, x) +Ksinc(x′, x′)− 2Ksinc(x, x′)) 6 2.6
h2
which yields a suitable bound for ∆ in this example.
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Example 2.14. The Epanechnikov kernel
K(x, y) = 34(1− |x− y|
2)1{|x−y|61}
is not positive definite. In order to see this, put x1 = 0, x2 = 1/2, x3 = 1, a1 = a3 = −0.9
and a2 = 1. Then,
3∑
i=1
3∑
j=1
aiK(xi, xj)aj =
3
4 [0.81 + 0.81 + 1− 2 · 0.9 · 0.75− 2 · 0.9 · 0.75] = −0.08 < 0,
in contradiction to the defining property (5) of positive definite kernels.
Example 2.15. The biweight kernel
K(x, y) = 1516(1− |x− y|
2)21{|x−y|61}
is not positive definite. To see this, put x1 = 1/4, x2 = −1/4, x3 = −3/4, and x4 = 1/2.
Then, consider the matrix M = (K(xi, xj))i,j∈J1,4K. We have
M˜ := 256M =

256 144 0 225
144 256 144 49
0 144 256 0
225 49 0 256
 ,
and the matrix M˜ is not positive definite, since for v =
(
0.7 −0.4 0.2 −0.5)>
v>M˜v = −0.94 < 0.
2.5. A composition lemma for approximate differential privacy. For kernel den-
sity estimation, bandwidth selection is usually a delicate issue and so it is in our local
privacy setup. Whereas in the centralized setup existing methods can be applied by the
trusted curator on the unmasked data, this is not possible in our local setup. Thus the
data holders have to publish versions of the kernel density estimator for different band-
widths, and one has to adapt general strategies from the non-private framework to the
one with local approximately differential private data. To do this under our privacy con-
straint it is necessary to understand how multiple outputs influence the defining condition
of approximate differential privacy. The following lemma provides a result of this flavour
and is known in the research literature on privacy for statistical databases. The setup
is the following: Given the unmasked datum X, the data owner does not only want to
publish Z1 = Z1(X) but also Z2 = Z2(X), i.e., the vector (Z1, Z2). The following re-
sult tells us how α and β for the single components have to be scaled in order to obtain
(α, β)-differential privacy for multiple outputs.
Lemma 2.16 (Composition lemma for (α, β)-differential privacy). Let Zi, i = 1, 2 be
(αi, βi)-differential private and conditionally (on X) independent views of X, respectively.
Then Z = (Z1, Z2) is an (α1 + α2, β1 + β2)-differential private view of X.
Of course, Lemma 2.16 can be successively applied. For instance, if we want to publish
Zi,h from the above examples for different h in a finite set H, then α and β should be
replaced with α′ = α/#H and β′ = β/#H, respectively, in order to get differential privacy
for Z = (Zi,h)h∈H.
3. Private minimax estimation
Minimax theory provides a standard framework to study convergence properties of
estimators in non-parametric statistics [Tsy09]. In this section, we apply this general
toolbox to the specific case of density estimation under privacy constraints. For fixed
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t ∈ R and any estimator ̂` of the linear functional f(t) based on the private views Z =
{Z1, . . . , Zn}, we study its mean squared error
E[(̂`− f(t))2].
The guiding principle of minimax theory is to look for estimators that perform best in a
worst-case scenario. However, due to the privacy framework, we have not only the freedom
of choosing the estimator ̂` but also the privacy mechanism Q that generates the private
outputs. Hence, following [DJW18], classical minimax theory has to be adapted and a
natural quantity to consider is the private minimax risk
inf̂`∈σ(Z)
Q∈Qα,β
sup
f∈P
E[(̂`− f(t))2]
where P is some function class containing probability densities and the infimum is taken
over all local (α, β)-differential private Markov kernels Q ∈ Qα,β and all estimators based
on the local approximate differential private views Z of the corresponding original sample
X1, . . . , Xn. We specify the function class P by so called Sobolev ellipsoids S(s, L) that
we define for s > 1/2 and L > 0 by means of
S(s, L) = {f : R→ [0,∞) :
∫
f(x)dx = 1,
∫
|F [f ](ω)|2|ω|2sdω 6 2piL2},
which, for s ∈ N∗, is equivalent to the definition
S(s, L) = {f : R→ [0,∞) :
∫
f(x)dx = 1,
∫
(f (s)(x))2dx 6 L2}.
In the first definition, F [f ] denotes the Fourier transform of the density f , in the second
one f (s) denotes the weak s-th derivative of f .
3.1. Upper bound. We first derive an upper bound on the minimax risk by specializing
both the privacy mechanism Q ∈ Qα,β and the estimator of f(t). Concerning the privacy
mechanism, we consider the mechanisms mapping Xi to private views Zi,h of Kh(Xi − t)
from Section 2 for one single h > 0. More precisely, we consider the Laplace mechanism
given through
Zi,h(t) = Kh(Xi − t) + 2‖K‖∞
h(α− log(1− β))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:CL
αβ
/(
√
2h)
ξi,h, ξi,h i.i.d. ∼ L(1), (7)
and the Gaussian process mechanism given through
Zi,h(t) = Kh(Xi − t) + ∆
′√2 log(1/(2β)) + 2α
hα︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:CGP
α,β
/h
Ξi,h (8)
where Ξi,h are i.i.d. Gaussian processes with covariance kernel K((x− y)/h) and ∆′ is an
upper bound on ‖(hKh)x − (hKh)x′‖H for x, x′ ∈ R. Given Z1,h, . . . , Zn,h as in (7) or (8),
a natural estimator of f(t) is given by
f̂h(t) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
Zi,h(t). (9)
The following proposition provides an upper risk bound for this estimator specialized with
the sinc-kernel over the Sobolev ellipsoids S(s, L) introduced above.
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Proposition 3.1. Consider the kernel density estimator f̂h(t) for some fixed t ∈ R where
the kernel used in the anonymization procedure (7) or (8) is the sinc-kernel from Exam-
ple 2.13. Then, for any s > 1/2,
sup
f∈S(s,L)
E[(f̂h(t)− f(t))2] 6 C
[
h2s−1 + 1
nh
+ 1
nh2
]
for some C = C(α, β, L, s, ‖f‖∞,Ksinc). In particular, setting h = h? with h?  n−1/(2s+1),
we obtain
sup
f∈S(s,L)
E[(f̂h?(t)− f(t))2] . n−
2s−1
2s+1 .
Since the noise added by the privacy mechanisms is centred, the bias term in the proof
of Proposition 3.1 remains unchanged in comparison to the standard setup without privacy
constraints. However, the variance term changes due to the additional Laplace or Gaussian
noise, respectively, and the classical variance term 1/(nh) is joined by the additional term
1/(nh2) which is of higher order for h → 0. Consequently, the optimal bandwidth is
no longer of order n−1/(2s) as in the standard setup but of the larger order n−1/(2s+1).
However, consistency of f̂h is already guaranteed if h → 0 and nh2 → ∞ simultaneously
(in the standard density estimation setup one only needs nh→∞ in addition to h→ 0).
3.2. Lower bound. The following result states a lower bound over Sobolev ellipsoids in
the case of pure differential privacy (β = 0).
Proposition 3.2. Let α > 0 arbitrary. Then,
inf̂`∈σ(Z)
Q∈Qα,0
sup
f∈S(s,L)
E[(̂`− f(t))2] > C(α)n− 2s−12s+1
where C(α) > 0 depends on the privacy parameter, and the infimum is taken over all
estimators ̂` based on private views Z1, . . . , Zn and privacy mechanisms providing (α, 0)-
differential privacy.
Remark 3.3. The lower bound of Proposition 3.2 still holds true when one allows a slight
amount of interaction between the data holders, namely when the distribution of every Zi
is determined by Xi and the previously masked values Z1, . . . , Zi−1. The proof remains
the same because the data processing inequality (14) from [DJW18] still holds true in this
more general setup.
Proposition 3.2 shows that, regarding the privacy parameter α as an a priori fixed
constant, the estimators f̂h(t) from Proposition 3.1 attain the optimal rate n−(2s−1)/(2s+1)
in terms of n under pure local differential privacy. Recall that without privacy restrictions
the optimal rate over Sobolev ellipsoids is n−(2s−1)/(2s) (as mentioned in [But01], this rate
can, other than by a reduction scheme as used in our proof, be easily obtained via the
theory developed in [DL92], see also [Tsy98]). In this work, we consider the parameters
α, β as fixed and are interested in the behaviour of the rate as a function of n only but
remarks concerning α analogous to the ones made in [But+19] could be made (as in that
paper, α and β could also be allowed to vary with n). The optimal behaviour, however,
of the rates in terms of the privacy parameters α and β, especially if β > 0, remains an
open issue.
4. Adaptation to unknown smoothness
The estimators of the previous section are not completely satisfying since the optimal
choice h?n of the bandwidth, as usually in non-parametric statistics, depends on a priori
knowledge of the smoothness of the unknown function f . Such knowledge is usually
not available in practise. At least, using the Gaussian process perturbation approach
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we relieved ourselves from the drawback of the Laplace method that one can privatize
only one functional of the form f(t) for one single t that has to be fixed even before the
anonymization. Note that this drawback is, for instance, also present in the mechanisms
suggested in [RS18]. From this point of view, anonymization of the whole kernel density
estimator via this approach should be preferred.
The purpose of this section is to address the remaining issue of adapting to the unknown
smoothness of f . In order to tackle this problem, we use a variant of Lepski’s method
(see [LS97] for a general account in the Gaussian white noise model, and [Cav01] for an
application to a tomography problem whose concise presentation has inspired our one).
Recall again that the necessity of novel methodology for adaptive estimation is specific
for the setup of local privacy since in the global case the trusted curator can choose the
bandwidth in an adaptive way using all the data X1, . . . , Xn and, as a consequence, can
build on the existing plethora of methods and theoretical results for this standard case;
hence bandwidth selection does not provide any additional difficulty for centralized privacy
since only the final output is anonymized. In our local setup, where the data owners publish
their data prior to any data analysis, adaptation must be addressed separately. Note that
the problem of adaptation has, to the best of the author’s knowledge, only been addressed
in the recent work [But+19] so far, where the authors use wavelet estimators for density
estimation on a compact interval. The approach in that paper is thus conceptionally
different from the one presented in the sequel.
We will apply Lepski’s method both on observations (7) where t ∈ R has been fixed
a priori and on pathwise observations (8) from the Gaussian process approach that we
evaluate at the point t ∈ R of interest. In order to apply Lepski’s method, the observations
(7) and (8) must be available for different values of the bandwidth parameter h, say h ∈ Hn.
This can be realized using Lemma 2.16 provided that the privacy parameters α and β are
appropriately scaled. Thus, we can assume that Zi,h(t) are accessible for any i ∈ J1, nK
and h ∈ Hn if we replace α and β by α′ = α/#Hn and β′ = β/#Hn, respectively. For
any h ∈ Hn and t ∈ R, we can then consider the estimator defined in (9). In our case, we
define the set of potential bandwidths by a geometrid grid,
Hn = {h ∈ [hn, hn] : h = a−jhn, j ∈ N},
where a > 1 is a fixed constant, hn is such that a log(hn
√
n)/
√
n 6 hn 6 1, and hn satisfies
hn = (log(hn
√
n) ∨ 1)/√n. For h ∈ Hn and some M > 0, define3
v2(h) = M
∫
K2(u)du
nh
+
C2α′β′
nh2
where Cα′β′ is defined as in Section 3. The proof of 3.1 shows that
Var(f̂h) 6 v2(h)
if ‖f‖∞ 6 M . Put λ(h) = max(1, (κ log(hn/h))1/2) with κ being a sufficiently large
constant (an explicit value can be determined from the proof of Theorem 4.3) and define
h∗n = h∗n(t, f) = max{h ∈ Hn : |fη(t)− f(t)| 6
v(h)λ(h)
2 for all η ∈ Hn, η 6 h}. (10)
If the set in the definition of h∗n is empty, we set h∗n = hn by convention. However, in
the proof of Proposition 4.1 we will show that this set is non-empty for n large enough.
The bandwidth h∗n is an oracle in the sense that it is not accessible by the statistician
since it depends on the unknown parameter f . The definition of h∗n provides some kind of
ideal criterion: The bandwidth h is increased along the grid Hn as long as the bias term
|fη(t)− f(t)| it is bounded by the ’rate’ v(h)λ(h), a procedure that aims at mimicking the
3In the sequel, we write Cα′β′ for both CLα′β′ and CGPα′β′ .
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classical bias-variance tradeoff. In order to state a risk bound for the pseudo estimator
f̂h∗n , we further define
rn(t, f) = inf
hn6h61
[
sup
06η6h
(fη(t)− f(t))2 + M
∫
K2(u)du log(n)
nh
+
C2α′β′ log(n)
nh2
]
.
Proposition 4.1. Consider the pseudo-estimator f̂h∗n defined via (9) and (10) where α
and β are replaced with α′ and β′, respectively. Assume that
lim
h→0
1
h
∫
K
(
x− t
h
)
f(x)dx = f(t). (11)
Consider hn = 1. Then, for n sufficiently large,
E[(f̂h∗n − f(t))2] 6
5
4v
2(h∗n)λ2(h∗n) 6 C(a)rn(t, f)
uniformly for all f with ‖f‖∞ 6M .
Remark 4.2. Assumption (11) is satisfied in many cases. For instance, if
∫ |K(u)|du <∞,
then (11) is a special case of Bochner’s lemma (see [Tsy04], Lemma 1.1). However, the sinc-
kernel is not absolutely integrable and thus Bochner’s lemma cannot be applied. In this
case, one can alternatively assume that f belongs at least to some Sobolev space S(s, L)
for some s > 1/2. Then, the analysis of the bias term as in the proof of Proposition 3.1
guarantees the validity of (11).
The pseudo estimator f̂h∗n is a stopover on our road to an adaptive estimator. We now
construct a genuine estimator of f that aims at mimicking this oracle. For this, we first
define
v2(h, η) = M
n
∫
(Kh(u)−Kη(u))2du+
C2α′β′
nh2
+
C2α′β′
nη2
.
Then, calculations similar to those in the proof of Proposition 3.1 show that
Var(f̂h − f̂η) 6 v2(h, η)
if ‖f‖∞ 6M . For h, η ∈ Hn, put
ψ(h, η) = v(h)λ(h) + v(h, η)λ(η).
Then, we define an adaptive choice of the bandwidth parameter by
ĥn = max{h ∈ Hn : |f̂h(t)− f̂η(t)| 6 ψ(h, η) for all η 6 h, h ∈ Hn}. (12)
This choice of the bandwidth is well-defined since the maximum is taken over a non-
empty set. The definition of ĥn is characteristic for Lepski’s method [Lep90], and the
motivation of this procedure is neatly described in [Cav01], p. 67: One chooses the largest
bandwidth h such that the difference between the two estimators f̂h and f̂η is not too large
(in the sense of (12)) for all η 6 h. Evidently, the motivation of this procedure is to mimick
the trade-off between squared bias and variance in a purely data-driven manner. Note also
that (12) provides, as well as the oracle version (10), a local choice of the bandwidth in
the sense that ĥn depends on t. Such a local criterion might result in a better adaptation
to spatial inhomogeneity of the target density than global selection rules.
Theorem 4.3. Consider the estimator f̂
ĥn
defined via (9) and (12) where Zi,h(t) for
h ∈ Hn are defined via (7) or (8) with α and β replaced with α′ and β′, respectively.
Then, uniformly for all f with ‖f‖∞ 6M ,
E[(f̂
ĥn
(t)− f(t))2] 6 C(a)v2(h∗n)λ2(h∗n).
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As a consequence, taking hn = 1, we obtain
E[(f̂
ĥn
(t)− f(t))2] 6 C(a)rn(t, f).
Remark 4.4. By specifying Theorem 4.3 with the sinc-kernel and hn = 1, one obtains an
adaptive estimator attaining the optimal rate of convergence over functions bounded by M
in a Sobolev ellipsoid up to an extra logarithmic factor. A logarithmic loss for adaptation
is commonly accepted and even known to be indispensable for pointwise estimation in the
non-private framework [BL96].
5. Discussion
We have suggested an approach to adaptive kernel density estimation via Lepski’s
method in the framework of local approximate differential privacy. Although we have
studied its theoretical properties in the prototypical example of univariate density esti-
mation only, our methodology should also be transferable to the multivariate case. We
also conjecture that it might be possible to extend our results to the case of general linear
functionals (different from pointwise evaluation of the density function at a fixed point)
as investigated in [GP00] via Lepski’s method in a inverse problem setup. Furthermore,
our methodology might be applicable to obtain local private estimation procedures in
functional data analysis. However, a lot of questions remain open: One drawback of our
approach is that the perturbation by a Gaussian process provides only approximate dif-
ferential privacy and cannot be extended to pure differential privacy. The creation of new
methods for kernel estimators that overcome this restriction provides a further direction
for future research. Moreover, the optimal power of the logarithmic factor in the adaptive
rate of convergence deserves further investigation as well as the behaviour of the minimax
optimal rates in terms of the privacy parameters α and β.
Appendix A. Proofs of Section 2
A.1. Proof of Proposition 2.2. Let A ∈ B(R) be arbitrary. It has to be shown that∫
A
1
2b exp
(
−|z − g(x)|
b
)
dz 6 eα
∫
A
1
2b exp
(
−|z − g(x
′)|
b
)
dz + β
for any x, x′ ∈ X. By the triangle inequality this holds true if∫
A
1
2b exp
(
−|z − g(x)|
b
)
dz 6 eα−
|g(x)−g(x′)|
b
∫
A
1
2b exp
(
−|z − g(x)|
b
)
dz + β,
and the latter holds true as soon as 1 6 exp (α−∆(g)/b) + β which is equivalent to
b > ∆(g)/(α− log(1− β)).
A.2. Proof of Proposition 2.4. We have to show that
PZ|X=x(A) 6 exp(α)PZ|X=x′(A) + β
for all A ∈ B(Rm). This condition is satisfied if the set where the ratio dPZ|X=x/dPZ|X=x′
exceeds exp(α) has probability bounded by β under PZ|X=x. We have
dPZ|X=x(z)
dPZ|X=x′(z)
= exp
( 1
2σ2
[
−(z − g(x))>Σ−1(z − g(x)) + (z − g(x′))>Σ−1(z − g(x′))
])
,
and the condition dP
Z|X=x(z)
dPZ|X=x′ (z) > exp(α) is equivalent to
1
2σ2
[
−(z − g(x))>Σ−1(z − g(x)) + (z − g(x′))>Σ−1(z − g(x′))
]
> α
which in turn can be reformulated as
2z>Σ−1(g(x)− g(x′)) + (g(x′))>Σ−1g(x′)− g(x)>Σ−1g(x) > 2σ2α. (13)
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Set Ω = {z ∈ Rm : (13) holds} and let ξ denote a N (0, Im) distributed random variable
where Im denotes the m×m-dimensional identity matrix. Then
PZ|X=x(Ω) = P(2σξ>Σ− 12 (g(x)− g(x′)) > 2σ2α− (g(x)− g(x′))>Σ−1(g(x)− g(x′)))
6 P(ξ>Σ−1/2(g(x)− g(x′)) > σα− ∆
2
2σ )
6 P(∆ν > σα− ∆
2
2σ )
= P(ν > σα∆ −
∆
2σ )
where ν is a univariate standard Gaussian random variable. We now use the standard
estimate P(ν > t) 6 e−t2/2/2 whose right-hand side is smaller than β ∈ (0, 1/2) if t2 >
−2 log(2β). We apply this estimate with t = σα∆ − ∆2σ , and thus PZ|X=x(Ω) 6 β if
σα
∆ −
∆
2σ >
√
2 log(1/(2β)),
and this holds at least if
σ > ∆
α
√
2 log(1/(2β)) + 2α.
A.3. Proof of Lemma 2.16. Let A ∈ Z1⊗Z2 be a measurable set. Denote Az1 = {z2 ∈
Z2 : (z1, z2) ∈ A} which is measurable. By Cavalieri’s principle and the independence
assumption
PZ|X=x(A) =
∫
Z1
PZ2|X=x(Az1)PZ1|X=x(dz1)
6
∫
Z1
(eα2PZ2|X=x′(Az1) ∧ 1 + β2)PZ1|X=x(dz1)
=
∫
Z1
(eα2PZ2|X=x′(Az1) ∧ 1)PZ1|X=x(dz1) +
∫
Z1
β2PZ1|X=x(dz1).
Now put Ω = {dPZ1|X=x/dPZ1|X=x′ 6 eα1} ⊆ Z1. Then PZ1|X=x(Ωc) 6 β1 since other-
wise there would be a contradiction to approximate differential privacy. Hence,
PZ|X=x(A) 6
∫
Z1∩Ω
eα1+α2PZ2|X=x′(Az1)PZ1|X=x
′(dz1) +
∫
Z1∩Ωc
PZ1|X=x(dz1) + β2
6 eα1+α2PZ|X=x′(A) + PZ1|X=x(Ωc) + β2
6 eα1+α2PZ|X=x′(A) + β1 + β2
which shows the claim assertion.
Appendix B. Proofs of Section 3
B.1. Proof of Proposition 3.1. The bias-variance decomposition for the estimator f̂h(t)
is
E[(f̂h(t)− f(t))2] = (fh(t)− f(t))2 + E[(f̂h(t)− fh(t))2]
where fh(t) = E[f̂h(t)]. We begin with the analysis of the bias. First recall that
f(t) = 12pi
∫
e−itωF [f ](ω)dω,
and due to centredness of the error added by the privacy mechanism
fh(t) =
∫ 1
h
Ksinc
(
u− t
h
)
f(u)du
= 12pih
∫
F
[
Ksinc
( · − t
h
)]
(ω)F [f ](ω)dω
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= 12pi
∫
e−itωF [Ksinc] (hω)F [f ](ω)dω.
Thus, using that F [Ksinc] (·) = 1[−pi,pi](·), we obtain
(fh(t)− f(t))2 = 14pi2
(∫
R
e−itω [1−F [Ksinc] (hω)]F [f ](ω)dω
)2
= 14pi2
(∫
R
e−itω1{|ω|>1/h}F [f ](ω)dω
)2
6 14pi2
∫
|F [f ](ω)|2|ω|2sdω ·
∫
1{|ω|>1/h}|ω|−2sdω
6 2piL
2
4pi2 ·
2
2s− 1h
2s−1 = C(L, s)h2s−1.
Let us now consider the variance, where we have to distinguish between the case of Laplace
mechanism and Gaussian mechanism. We denote
f˜h(t) =
1
nh
n∑
i=1
Ksinc
(
Xi − t
h
)
.
For the Laplace mechanism, we have by denoting ξ ∼ L(1) that
E[(f̂h(t)− fh(t))2] = Var(f˜h) + 1
n
Var
(∆(Ksinc((t− ·)/h)/h)
α− log(1− β) ξ
)
6 ‖f‖∞
∫
K2sinc(u)du
nh
+ 8‖Ksinc‖
2∞
nh2(α− log(1− β))2
6 C(‖f‖∞,Ksinc, α, β)
[ 1
nh
+ 1
nh2
]
.
In a similar fashion, for the Gaussian mechanism, now letting ξ ∼ N (0, 1), we have
E[(f̂h(t)− fh(t))2] = Var(f˜h) + 1
n
Var
(
2‖Ksinc‖∞
√
2 log(1/2β) + 2α
αh
ξ
)
6 ‖f‖∞
∫
K2sinc(u)du
nh
+ 4‖Ksinc‖
2∞(2 log(1/(2β)) + 2α)
nh2α2
6 C(‖f‖∞,Ksinc, α, β)
[ 1
nh
+ 1
nh2
]
.
The statement of the proposition follows now by combining the obtained bounds for
squared bias and variance.
B.2. Proof of Proposition 3.2. Let ̂`, Q ∈ Qα be arbitrary as in the statement of the
proposition. Define ψn > 0 via ψ2n = n
− 2s−12s+1 . Let f0,n, f1,n be two functions in S(s, L)
(to be specified later on) such that (f0,n(t) − f1,n(t))2 & ψ2n. Using a general reduction
argument (see [Tsy09], Section 2.2) it can be shown that
sup
f∈S(s,L)
ψ−2n E[(̂`− f(t))2] > ψ−2n sup
θ∈{0,1}
E[(̂`− fθ,n(t))2]
& ψ−2n infτ maxθ∈{0,1}Pθ(τ = 1− θ)
where the infimum is taken over all {0, 1}-valued test functions τ based on the observations
Z1, . . . , Zn and Pθ denotes the distribution of Z1, . . . , Zn if the true density of X1, . . . , Xn
is fθ,n. In view of [Tsy09], Theorem 2.2, Statement (iii), the claim assertion follows if we
can choose the functions f0,n and f1,n such that
(1) f0,n, f1,n ∈ S(s, L),
(2) (f0,n(t)− f1,n(t))2 & ψ2n, and
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(3) KL(P0,P1) 6 C <∞ for some C independent of n.
To construct such f0,n, f1,n we use ideas from Section 6 of [But01] and refer to this paper
also for some of the computations. First, take a strictly positive probability density f on R
that is infinitely often continously differentiable. Setting ‖f (s)‖22 = 12pi
∫
R|F [f ](ω)|2|ω|2sdω,
we can further assume that ‖f (s)‖2 6 L. Then, for δ ∈ (0, 1/2), define the function f0,n
by
f0,n(x) = f0(x) =
(
δ
2
) 1
s+1/2
f
(
x
(
δ
2
) 1
s+1/2
)
.
In order to define the second hypothesis f1,n we consider the auxiliary function K˜s as
introduced on p. 26 of [But01] (its construction in that paper is borrowed from [Tsy98]).
In particular, note that K˜s is compactly supported and satisfies ‖K˜(s)s ‖2 6 1− δ/2 (thus
K˜s ∈ S(s, 1)) and K˜s(0) > (1− δ)C(s) > 0. Set hn = (n(exp(α)− 1)2)−1/(2s+1), and put
gn,s(x) = cLh
s− 12
n K˜
(
x− t
hn
)
for some constant c > 0. Defining γn,s =
∫
gn,s(x)dx <∞, set
fn,1(x) = fn,0(x)(1− γn,s) + gn,s(x).
We now check conditions (1)–(3) from above.
Verification of (1): The proof follows step by step along the lines of the one in [But01] and
we omit the details. We only record the fact that
γn,s = cLh
s+ 12
n
∫
K˜s(u)du = O(h
s+ 12
n )
which will be used below.
Verification of (2): We have
(fn,0(t)− fn,1(t))2 = (fn,0(t)− (1− γn)f0,n(t)− g(t))2
= |γn,sf0,n(t)− g(t)|2
> ||g(t)| − |γn,sf0,n(t)||2.
Now, since gn(t) = Ch
s− 12
n and γn = O(h
s+ 12
n ), the last expression inside the outer absolute
values is greater than Chs−
1
2
n for sufficiently large n, say n > n0. Hence for n > n0,
(fn,0(t)− fn,1(t))2 > Ch2s−1n = C(α)n−
2s−1
2s+1
which is the desired bound.
Verification of (3): By Equation (14) in [DJW18] we have
KL(P0,P1) 6 4n(exp(α)− 1)2TV2(PX10 ,PX11 ). (14)
Now
TV(PX10 ,P
X1
1 ) =
∫
|fn,0(x)− fn,1(x)|dx
=
∫
R
|−γn,sfn,0(x) + gn(x)|dx
6 γn,s
∫
|fn,0(x)|dx+
∫
R
|gn(x)|dx
6 O(hs+
1
2
n ) + Ch
s− 12
n
∫
K˜
(
x− t
hn
)
dx
6 O(hs+
1
2
n ) + C(n(exp(α)− 1)2)− 12
∫
K˜(u)du
6 C(n(exp(α)− 1)2)− 12 .
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for n sufficiently large. Thus, by (14), for n sufficiently large
KL(P0,P1) 6 Cn(exp(α)− 1)2TV2(PX10 ,PX11 ) 6 C.
Appendix C. Proofs of Section 4
C.1. Proof of Proposition 4.1. Under Assumption (11), we have that sup0<η6h|fη(t)−
f(t)|2 converges to zero as h → 0. Let n > 3. By definition of v2(·), λ(·) and hn =
log(
√
n)/
√
n (since hn = 1),
v2(hn)λ2(hn) >
M
∫
K2(u)du√
n log(
√
n) +
C2α′β′
log(
√
n) · κ log(
√
n/ log(
√
n)),
hence lim infn→∞ v(hn)λ(hn) > 0, and the set in the definition of h∗n is non-empty provided
that n is sufficiently large. Now, the bias-variance decomposition of the pseudo estimator
is
E[(f̂h∗n(t)− f(t))2] = (fh∗n(t)− f(t))2 + Varf (f̂h∗n)
6 (fh∗n(t)− f(t))2 + v2(h∗n)
6 v
2(h∗n)λ2(h∗n)
4 + v
2(h∗n)
6 54v
2(h∗n)λ2(h∗n).
Let now h0 be the minimizer in the definition of rn(t, f). We distinguish the cases
h0 < ah∗n and h0 > ah∗n. First, if h0 < ah∗n, then
rn(t, f) = sup
06η6h0
(fη(x)− f(x))2 + M
∫
K2(u)du log(n)
nh0
+
C2α′β′ log(n)
nh20
> M
∫
K2(u)du log(n)
nh0
+
C2α′β′ log(n)
nh20
> M
∫
K2(u)du log(n)
anh∗n
+
C2α′β′ log(n)
na2(h∗n)2
> C(a, κ)v2(h∗n)λ2(h∗n).
If h0 > ah∗n, then by the very definition of h∗n we obtain
rn(t, f) > sup
06η6h0
(fη(t)− f(t))2 > sup
06η6ah∗n
(fη(t)− f(t))2 > v
2(ah∗n)λ2(ah∗n)
4 ,
and thus rn(t, f) & v2(h∗n)λ2(h∗n) also in this case.
C.2. Proof of Theorem 4.3. We consider the risk decomposition
E[(f̂
ĥn
(t)− f(t))2] = E[(f̂
ĥn
(t)− f(t))21{ĥn>h∗n}] + E[(f̂ĥn(t)− f(t))
21{ĥn<h∗n}],
and study the two terms on the right-hand side separately.
Analysis of the first term (Case ĥn > h∗n). Note that the quantities v(·), λ(·) satisfy
v(h) > v(h′) and λ(h) > λ(h′) for h′ > h. Thus, using the inequality (a+ b)2 6 2a2 + 2b2,
we have for h 6 h′ that
ψ(h′, h) = v(h′)λ(h′) + v(h′, h)λ(h)
6 v(h)λ(h) + 2
√
2v(h)λ(h)
= (1 + 2
√
2)v(h)λ(h).
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By the definition of ψ and ĥn, we obtain
|f̂
ĥn
(t)− f̂h∗n(t)|1{ĥn>h∗n} 6 ψ(ĥn, h
∗
n)
6 sup{ψ(η, h∗n) : η ∈ Hn, η > h∗n}
6 (1 + 2
√
2)v(h∗n)λ(h∗n).
Hence (recall that we denote fh(t) = E[f̂h(t)]),
E[(f̂
ĥn
(t)− f(t))21{ĥn>h∗n}]
6 2E[(f̂
ĥn
(t)− f̂h∗n(t))21{ĥn>h∗n}] + 2E[(f̂h∗n(t)− f(t))
2]
= 2E[(f̂
ĥn
(t)− f̂h∗n(t))21{ĥn>h∗n}] + 2E[(f̂h∗n(t)− fh∗n(t))
2] + 2(fh∗n(t)− f(t))2
. v2(h∗n)λ2(h∗n)
where we used the bound Var(f̂h∗n) 6 v2(h∗n) for the term 2E[(f̂h∗n(t) − fh∗n(t))2] and the
definition of h∗n to bound the term (fh∗n(t)− f(t))2.
Analysis of the second term (Case ĥn < h∗n). For h, η ∈ Hn with η < h, set
Bn(t, h, η) = {|f̂h(t)− f̂η(t)| > ψ(h, η)}.
Let h in Hn. Then, by definition of ĥn,
{ĥn = a−1h} ⊆
⋃
η∈Hn
η<h
Bn(t, h, η),
and thus
{ĥn < h∗n} =
⋃
h∈Hn
h<h∗n
{ĥn = h}
⊆
⋃
h∈Hn
h<ah∗n
{ĥn = a−1h}
=
⋃
h∈Hn
h<ah∗n
⋃
η∈Hn
η<h
Bn(t, h, η).
We obtain
E[(f̂
ĥn
(t)− f(t))21{ĥn<h∗n}] 6
∑
h∈Hn
h<ah∗n
E[(f̂a−1h(t)− f(t))21{ĥn=a−1h}]
6
∑
h∈Hn
h<ah∗n
∑
η∈Hn
η<h
E[(f̂a−1h(t)− f(t))21Bn(t,h,η)].
By definition of h∗n, for all η, h ∈ Hn with η < h 6 h∗n, it holds
|fη(t)− f(t)| 6 v(h
∗
n)λ(h∗n)
2 6
v(h)λ(h)
2 .
Now, for η < h 6 h∗n,
Bn(t, h, η) = {|f̂h(t)− f̂η(t)| > ψ(h, η)}
= {|f̂h(t)− f̂η(t)− (fh(x)− fη(t)) + fh(t)− fη(t)− f(t) + f(t)| > ψ(h, η)}
⊆
{
v(h)λ(h) +
∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
n∑
i=1
ζi
∣∣∣∣∣ > ψ(h, η)
}
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⊆
{∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
n∑
i=1
ζi
∣∣∣∣∣ > v(h, η)λ(η)
}
where ζi = ζi,h,η = Zi,h(t) − Zi,η(t) − (fh(t) − fη(t)). Note that Eζi = 0 and Var(ζi) 6
nv2(h, η). Now, by the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality,
E[(f̂
ĥn
(t)− f(t))21{ĥn<h∗n}] 6
∑
h∈Hn
h<ah∗n
∑
η∈Hn
η<h
E[(f̂a−1h(t)− f(t))21{| 1
n
∑n
i=1 ζi|>v(h,η)λ(η)}]
6
∑
h∈Hn
h<ah∗n
∑
η∈Hn
η<h
(
E[(f̂a−1h(t)− f(t))4]
)1/2(
P
(∣∣∣∣ 1n
n∑
i=1
ζi
∣∣∣∣ > v(h, η)λ(η)
))1/2
.
For the first term in the sum, we have
E[(f̂a−1h(t)− f(t))4] = E[(f̂a−1h(t)− fa−1h(t) + fa−1h(t)− f(t))4]
6 8E[(f̂a−1h(t)− fa−1h(t))4] + 8(fa−1h(t)− f(t))4.
Putting ζ ′i = Zi,a−1h(t)− fa−1h(t), we have
E
[
(f̂a−1h(t)− fa−1h(t))4
]
= E
( 1
n
n∑
i=1
ζ ′i
)4 6 E[(ζ ′i)4]
n3
+ 3(E[(ζ
′
i)2])2
n2
.
On the one hand,
E[(ζ ′i)4] .
C4α′β′
a−4h4
+ 1
a−4h4
E
[(
K
(
X − t
a−1h
)
−E
[
K
(
X − t
a−1h
)])4]
.
C4α′β′
a−4h4
+ 8
a−4h4
E
[(
K
(
X − t
a−1h
))4]
+ 8
a−4h4
(
E
[
K
(
X − t
a−1h
)])4
. 1
a−4h4
+ 1
a−3h3
+ 1,
on the other hand
E[(ζ ′i)2] .
C2α′β′
a−2h2
+ 1
a−1h
.
Hence,
E[(f̂a−1h(t)− fa−1h(t))4] 6 Cv4(a−1h).
Moreover, for a−1h < h∗n,
(fa−1h(t)− f(t))4 6
v4(h∗n)λ4(h∗n)
16
by the very definition of h∗n. Thus, altogether,
E[(f̂a−1h(t)− f(t))4] 6 C(v4(a−1h) + v4(h∗n)λ4(h∗n)),
and by the monotonicity of v(·) and λ(·), for η < h 6 h∗n
E[(f̂a−1h(t)− f(t))4] 6 Cλ4(η)v4(a−1h).
Write ζi = ζ(1)i + ζ
(2)
i where ζ
(1)
i = Kh(Xi − t) −Kη(Xi − t) − (fh(t) − fη(t)) and ζ(2)i =
Cα′β′√
2h ξi,h +
Cα′β′√
2η ξi,η with ξi,h, ξi,η i.i.d.∼ L(1) or ζ
(2)
i =
Cα′β′
h ξi,h +
Cα′β′
η ξi,η with ξi,h, ξi,η
i.i.d.∼ N (0, 1) for i = 1, . . . , n. We have
P
(∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
n∑
i=1
ζi
∣∣∣∣∣ > v(h, η)λ(η)
)
6 P
(∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
n∑
i=1
ζ
(1)
i
∣∣∣∣∣ > v(h, η)λ(η)2
)
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+ P
(∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
n∑
i=1
ζ
(2)
i
∣∣∣∣∣ > v(h, η)λ(η)2
)
.
Consider P
(∣∣∣ 1n∑ni=1 ζ(1)i ∣∣∣ > v(h,η)λ(η)2 ) first. By Bernstein’s inequality (see Lemma D.1)
with b = 4‖K‖∞/η,
P
(∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
n∑
i=1
ζ
(1)
i
∣∣∣∣∣ > v(h, η)λ(η)2
)
6 2 max
{
exp
(
−nv
2(h, η)λ2(η)
4nv2(h, η)
)
, exp
(
−nv(h, η)λ(η)η32‖K‖∞
)}
= 2 max
{
exp
(
−λ
2(η)
4
)
, exp
(
−nv(h, η)λ(η)η32‖K‖∞
)}
.
Note that
v(h, η) > Cα′β′√
nη
.
For any h ∈ Hn and n large enough, it holds√
n >
√
κ log(
√
n) >
√
κ log(hn
√
n) =
√
κ log(hn/(1/
√
n))) >
√
κ log(hn/h).
Thus
P
(∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
n∑
i=1
ζ
(1)
i
∣∣∣∣∣ > v(h, η)λ(η)2
)
6 2 max
{
exp
(
−λ
2(η)
4
)
, exp
(
−Cα′β′
√
nλ(η)
32‖K‖∞
)}
6 2 exp
(
−κ
(1
4 ∧
Cα′β′
32‖K‖∞
)
log
(
hn
η
))
. (15)
For the probability in terms of ζ(2)i , we consider now the Gaussian case first. Using
standard concentration results for the Gaussian distribution, we obtain
P
(∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
n∑
i=1
ζ
(2)
i
∣∣∣∣∣ > v(h, η)λ(η)2
)
6 2 exp
(
−n
2t2
2σ2
)
where t = v(h, η)λ(η)/2 and σ2 denotes the variance of the Gaussian random variable∑n
i=1 ζ
(2)
i . Then,
n2t2
2σ2 =
n2v2(h, η)λ2(η)
8σ2 >
λ2(η)
8 >
κ log(hn/η)
8 .
Thus,
P
(∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
n∑
i=1
ζ
(2)
i
∣∣∣∣∣ > v(h, η)λ(η)2
)
6 2 exp
(
−κ log(hn/η)8
)
. (16)
Combining (15) and (16), we obtain for the Gaussian case
P
(∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
n∑
i=1
ζi
∣∣∣∣∣ > v(h, η)λ(η)
)
6 4 exp
(
−
(
κ
8 ∧
κCα′β′
32‖K‖∞
)
log(hn/η)
)
,
and we denote κ′ = κ8 ∧
κCα′β′
32‖K‖∞ .
Let us now consider the probability in terms of ζ(2)i for the Laplace case which is a little
bit more involved since the sum of two Laplace random variables is not Laplace anymore.
We decompose
P
(∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
n∑
i=1
ζ
(2)
i
∣∣∣∣∣ > v(h, η)λ(η)2
)
6 P
(∣∣∣∣∣ Cα′β′√2nh
n∑
i=1
ξi,h
∣∣∣∣∣ > v(h, η)λ(η)4
)
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+ P
(∣∣∣∣∣ Cα′β′√2nη
n∑
i=1
ξi,η
∣∣∣∣∣ > v(h, η)λ(η)4
)
.
Consider only the first probability on the right-hand side, the bound for the second one
following analogously. By Bernstein’s inequality (see Lemma D.1, take the version with
control on the moments applied with t = v(h, η)λ(η)/4, v2 = C2α′β′/h2 and b = Cα′β′/h)
P
(∣∣∣∣∣ Cα′β′√2nh
n∑
i=1
ξi,h
∣∣∣∣∣ > v(h, η)λ(η)4
)
6 2 max
{
exp
(
−nt
2
4v2
)
, exp
(
−nt4b
)}
6 2 max
{
exp
(
−λ
2(η)
64
)
, exp
(
−
√
nλ(η)
16
)}
,
and hence by using
√
n > √κ log(hn/η),
P
(∣∣∣∣∣ Cα′β′√2nh
n∑
i=1
ξi,h
∣∣∣∣∣ > v(h, η)λ(η)4
)
6 2 exp
(
− κ64 log
(
hn
η
))
.
Finally, we obtain with κ′ = κ64 ∧
κCα′β′
32‖K‖∞ that
P
(∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
n∑
i=1
ζ
(2)
i
∣∣∣∣∣ > v(h, η)λ(η)2
)
6 4 exp
(
−κ′ log
(
hn
η
))
in the Laplace case. Note that
P
(∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
n∑
i=1
ζ
(2)
i
∣∣∣∣∣ > v(h, η)λ(η)2
)
6 4 exp
(
−κ′ log
(
hn
η
))
for both cases with different choices of κ′. Now,
E[(f̂
ĥn
(t)− f(t))21{ĥn<h∗n}] .
∑
h∈H
h<ah∗n
∑
η∈H
η<h
λ2(η)v2(a−1h) exp
(
−κ
′
2 log
(
hn
η
))
.
For sufficiently small γ > 04, we have∑
η∈Hn
η<h
λ2(η) exp
(
−κ
′
2 log
(
hn
η
))
.
(
h
hn
)κ′/2−γ ∑
η∈Hn
η<h
log
(
hn
η
)(
η
hn
)γ
.
(
h
hn
)κ′/2−γ ∞∑
j=0
ja−γj log(a)
.
(
h
hn
)κ′/2−γ
.
Recall that v2(h)  1nh + 1nh2 . Thus,
E[(f̂
ĥn
(t)− f(t))21{ĥn<h∗n}] .
∑
h∈Hn
h<ah∗n
(
h
hn
)κ′/2−γ
v2(a−1h)
. hn
n
∑
h∈H
h<ah∗n
(
h
hn
)κ′/2−γ−1
+ h
2
n
nα2
∑
h∈H
h<ah∗n
(
h
hn
)κ′/2−γ−2
.
4Our calculations show that γ > 0 has to satisfy also that κ′/2 − γ − 2 > 0. Such a choice is possible
whenever κ′/2− 2 > 0 which holds for κ large enough.
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The sums on the right-hand side converge and the bound for the case ĥn < h∗n is negligible
with respect to the upper bound v2(h∗n)λ2(h∗n).
Appendix D. Bernstein inequality
The following version of the Bernstein inequality is taken from [Com15].
Lemma D.1. Let X1, . . . , Xn be i.i.d. random variables and put Sn =
∑n
i=1(Xi −E[Xi]).
Then, for any t > 0,
P(|Sn −E[Sn]| > nt) 6 2 exp
(
− nt
2
2v2 + 2bη
)
6 2 max
{
exp
(
−nt
2
4v2
)
, exp
(
−nt4b
)}
where Var(X1) 6 v2 and |X1| 6 b (or E[|Xi|m] 6 m!2 v2bm−2 for m > 2).
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